What are the conditions under which some austerity programs rely on substantial cuts to social spending? More specifically, do the partisan complexion and the type of government condition the extent to which austerity policies imply welfare state retrenchment? We demonstrate that large budget consolidations tend to be associated with welfare state retrenchment. Our findings support a partisan and a politico-institutionalist argument: (i) in periods of fiscal consolidation, welfare state retrenchment tends to be more pronounced under left-wing governments. (ii) Since welfare state retrenchment is electorally and politically risky, it also tends to be more pronounced when pursued by a broad pro-reform coalition government. Therefore, we show that during budget consolidations implemented by left-wing broad coalition governments, welfare state retrenchment is greatest. Using long-run multipliers from autoregressive distribute lag models on 17 OECD countries during the 1982-2009 period, we find substantial support for our expectations.
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Introduction
Since the 1980s, austerity has been the dominant topic in the debate on fiscal policies in democratic OECD-nations. Austerity policies are aimed at fiscal consolidation either by cutting public expenditure or raising taxes. Usually both elements are implemented simultaneously with an emphasis on spending cuts that target several policy fields. Yet given its sheer size in public budgets, the welfare state can hardly be spared. What are the conditions under which some austerity programs rely on substantial cuts to social spending?
We combine two main arguments. First, left parties are viewed as trustworthy advocates of the welfare state that would not slash it for narrow ideological reasons, but instead, choose to remodel it in order to keep it sustainable in the long run (see e.g. Ross, 2000) . As a result, left-wing governments may be best able to reduce social spending in periods of fiscal consolidation.
The second argument concerns the type of government and the requirement of stable majorities necessary for big reforms, as well as the accompanying electoral risks (Pierson, 1994) . The larger a pro-reform coalition, the more likely will adjustment burdens be balanced across electoral groups, and the less likely will a strong parliamentary or extra-parliamentary opposition be present and able to exploit the electoral vulnerability of the governing parties implementing a consolidation. The resulting reform package is therefore more time-consistent and unlikely to be repealed after the next election. This applies to surplus coalitions, but also to minority governments that have to build large policy-field specific parliamentary majorities (Lijphart, 2012: 79-93) .
Given these two arguments, we expect the strongest reductions in social spending during fiscal consolidation to be implemented under broad coalition governments with a substantial participation of left-wing parties.
Our hypothesis is in contrast to extant and most recent research. Both Jensen and Mortensen (2014) and show that right parties slash the welfare state mostall other things being equal. According to these authors the logic of political competition between left and right produces generally the same substantive outcomes before and during austerity. We challenge this standard argument by using a new data set on austerity, which is hardly analysed in social sciences research (with the exception of and ), and by estimating a more appropriate model: an autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) general dynamic model without the invalid restrictive specifications often found in standard time series cross-sectional analyses (De Boef & Keele, 2008) .
Even more importantly, we build on established findings of the literature on consensus democracies (Lijphart, 2012: 79-93) , on most recent insights about the reform capacity of large coalitions (Alexiadou, 2013) and about the preconditions for policy reform that produce stable and sustainable outcomes in the interest of the common good (Jacobs, 2011) . Our article adds to existing evidence that large coalitions are better able to enact policy change than single party governments.
We compile a dataset to compare the experiences with austerity policies in 17 OECD countries during the 1982 to 2009 period. Below, we develop our theoretical argument on the government may not matter if the pressure exerted by international markets or supranational organizations, such as the EU or the IMF commands austerity, because welfare state cutbacks would then be depicted as natural components in the consolidation of strained fiscal resources.
Yet, this argument is blind against the options and electoral calculus of political parties.
A basic argument of the power-resources and partisan theory of welfare state development (see Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hibbs, 1977; Hicks & Swank, 1992; Korpi, 1983; Korpi & Palme, 2003; Schmidt, 2010) states that left parties (and with some qualifications Christian democratic parties) are the strongest supporters of the welfare state-well aligned with the interest of their voters (historically from the lower strata of society) in a redistributive safety net. From this perspective, left parties should be most reluctant to pursue austerity policies that imply welfare retrenchment. Liberal and conservative parties, in contrast, have tended to oppose the development and expansion of the welfare state from its emergence, and may, therefore, be more inclined to use the opportunity to decrease social spending. In their analyses of austerity policies, and Jensen and Mortensen (2014) recently provided empirical support for this hypothesis.
These traditional partisan effects may well have dwindled in the era of globalization and austerity (see e.g. Huber & Stephens, 2001) . In fact, the direction of partisan influence could have gone into reverse, now being driven by the logic of welfare state retrenchment, which is very different to the logic of welfare state growth. During its expansion, the welfare state has built its own battalions. Largely irrespective of their ideological orientations, the overwhelming majority of citizens support the welfare state to which they have contributed in the past and from which they expect returns in the future. In consequence, the politics of welfare retrenchment is the politics of blame avoidance (Pierson, 1994) . For a number of reasons left parties may be particularly well suited to retrench the welfare state. For example, a left-wing government does not tend to provoke suspicions that it slashes the welfare state on narrow ideological grounds, but can build on its reputation as a defender of the welfare state even as it implements cutbacks. This is the so-called 'Nixon goes to China'-effect (see GreenPedersen (2002) , Kitschelt (2001) . Indeed the politics of the 'new' welfare state may be substantially different from the welfare state's four decades after WWII (Bonoli & Natali, 2013 ). Therefore we expect that in times of fiscal consolidation, left-wing governments are more likely to pursue rigorous cuts to welfare state spending than their right-wing counterparts.
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Our second argument concerns the type of government. Which one will be best prepared to engage in welfare state retrenchment? Theories of veto players give a clear answer: The odds should be best for centralized one-party governments that are supported by a majority of seats in parliament (see for example Tsebelis, 2002) . They do not have to make compromises with coalition partners watering down the austerity plans. They have the necessary majority to pursue a consistent and encompassing policy package. In addition, they can design policies in such a way that the clientele of the opposition mainly bears the costs of the policy. The odds should be second best for minimal winning governments, which include only as many parties as necessary for a parliamentary majority. The odds should be worst for minority governments, which need to build ad hoc coalitions for policies, as well as for oversized coalition governments. Both of these latter forms of government will have to make concessions to other parties, and will have a hard time designing policies that externalize costs to the remaining actors-since most of them are formally (oversized coalition) or informally (minority government) integrated into the government.
What seems to be weakness at first sight, however, could turn out to be strength. In his analyses of consensus democracies, Arend Lijphart demonstrates that these types of 6 democracies, which typically feature oversized coalitions or minority governments, achieve rather favourable and sustainable policy outcomes in processes of negotiation and compromise (Lijphart, 2008 (Lijphart, , 2012 . Majoritarian democracies, in contrast, which typically feature one-party governments or minimal winning coalitions, are prone to 'zick-zack-policies' dictated by electoral cycles and short-term achievements, which tend to be undone by incoming new administrations. If a government intends to govern for the long-term (Jacobs, 2011) , however, it makes sense to include all the relevant actors in a reform coalition, to build a consensus and generate trust that costs are shared equally by all actors, and to beware of aggressive cost-externalization. This makes it feasible to invest in the long-term, making compromises and sacrifices in order to facilitate a sound fiscal position and a sustainable welfare state in the future, and to steer clear of short-sighted populist initiatives for immediate but short-lived political gain (see also the argument about cooperative veto-points by Birchfeld & Crepaz, 1998; Crepaz, 1996; Crepaz, 1998) . A major advantage of this approach is the reduction of the electoral costs of austerity and social security cutbacks. By definition, only few actors are excluded from a broad coalition. In consequence, there are only few actors available outside the coalition, which could organize a powerful opposition to, and launch a potent electoral campaign against the government implementing unpopular reforms and cutbacks. Alexiadou (2013) provides strong empirical evidence for such counter-intuitive effects of broad coalitions. Bonoli (2000) finds similar results for pension reforms.
Our central argument about the type of government should not be confused with the argument of blame avoidance by obfuscation. Jensen and Mortensen (2014) show that welfare state retrenchment is facilitated by a large number of veto points (institutional fragmentation), since under these conditions blame attribution is difficult. While these authors explicitly exclude the type of government, we consider it to be a major explanatory variable for retrenchment. In other words, we emphasize a causal chain that works through the rational strategy of political actors to minimize opposition by inclusion, and the mutual and balanced compensation of electoral constituencies. Jensen and Mortensen (2014) , in contrast, point to the logic of blame avoidance by obfuscation, which constitutes a second causal chain that may certainly also be at work.
Our arguments about the impact of the partisan complexion and the type of government on welfare state retrenchment in times of austerity can be condensed into the following hypothesis: All other things equal, both the presence of a left-wing government or that of a broad governing coalition should by itself tend to foster welfare state retrenchment in periods of fiscal consolidation. We therefore expect the strongest reduction in public social spending to occur if both conditions are met simultaneously. Alternatively, fiscal adjustments implemented by non-left narrow coalition governments should be least likely to lead to a substantial trimming of the social safety net.
Moreover, at the beginning of this section we have emphasized the substantial relative weight of welfare-related items in public budgets. As a result of this weight, the degree of welfare state retrenchment should be associated with the size of a fiscal consolidation package.
While a relatively minor adjustment may be realized without touching social security, any big program can hardly shun social policies. By implication, relatively large austerity programs in particular should be associated with decreasing public social expenditures. In addition to that, also the magnitude of both our partisan and our government type effect may be affected by the size of an austerity program: they are likely to be more pronounced when a fiscal consolidation is particularly large. In addition to our major hypothesis, we will therefore examine the implicit assumption that both (a) the main effect of a consolidation on the welfare state, and (b) the conditional impact of parties and the type of government on this relationship, are more pronounced in the context of relatively large austerity programs.
Data and Operationalization
The focus of this paper is on the degree to which fiscal consolidation implies welfare state retrenchment. In other words, is the welfare state-conditioned by the partisan complexion and/or the type of government-at the core of policies intended to reduce budget deficits and debts?
Against this background, it becomes apparent why we conceptualize welfare state retrenchment exclusively in quantitative budgetary terms. We treat the welfare state simply as one of the most important spending categories of government budgets-and for its redistributive function the size of this category tends to be strongly associated with income inequality. The welfare state's more qualitative features, such as its institutional structure, its program coverage, or generosity, are not at the core of this paper. Therefore, we do not analyse the extent to which fiscal adjustments imply a rebalancing of the welfare state, such as, for instance, a stronger emphasis on family or active labour market policies at the expense of pension or health policies.
Our dependent variable is operationalized as the annual change (first differences 2 ) in total public social expenditures as a percentage of GDP, as provided by the OECD. 3 The use of change rates (as opposed to levels) is, from a theoretical point of view, implied by our Our main independent variable is the occurrence of fiscal consolidation, but we also distinguish between different sizes of consolidations. The standard approach in comparative political economy to operationalize fiscal consolidation starts from changes in countries' primary budget balance (Wagschal & Wenzelburger, 2008b We construct binary variables indicating FA episodes. The continuous variablebased on the size of adjustment in percentage of GDP-is censored in the sense that it does not properly distinguish between 'no-FA-cases' and FA of zero or very small size. Therefore, in order to distinguish between 'no-FA-cases' on the one hand, and those of different sizes on the other, the data enters our statistical analyses in one of two ways: a general FA dummy variable that equals 1 for all 159 FA cases in the sample and 0 otherwise, and a dummy variable to identify large fiscal adjustments. 6 In line with the most commonly used threshold in economic research (see Alesina & Ardagna, 2009; IMF, 2012, p. 53; Wagschal & Wenzelburger, 2008a) consolidations exceeding 1.5% of GDP qualify as 'large'. Using continuous versions of these dummy variables 7 does not, however, alter our findings. We restrict our analysis to the set of countries and time periods covered by the Devries-data set. Table 1 provides an overview of all fiscal adjustment cases in our sample.
[ Table 1 about here]
The other major independent variables are the partisan complexion of governments and the breadth of the policy coalition. Both are operationalized as binary variables based on data from Armingeon et al. (2014) . With respect to government partisanship, we use data for the percentage of cabinet posts occupied by left-wing parties. A dummy variable is coded 1 if left parties held more than 50% of cabinet posts in a given country-year. While cabinet shares do not always exactly reflect the real distribution of power within governments, our dummy indicating an absolute majority is likely to indicate a government dominated by left ideology.
Moreover, around 63% of all governments in our sample have a left party cabinet share of either 100% or 0%. Adjusting the dummy variables so that exactly 50% of cabinet posts also indicate left-wing governments or using the continuous version of the variable, does not alter our findings.
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The breadth of the policy coalition is operationalized as a dummy variable based on the type of government. If a government is a surplus coalition in the sense that it has more parties than needed for a parliamentary majority, it is classified as a 'broad' coalition (dummy 12 = 1). Likewise, minority governments usually negotiate policy-specific majorities-they would otherwise not be able to shape the legislative process-and are thus also classified as broad coalitions. Single party or minimal winning coalition governments, in contrast, are classified as 'narrow' coalitions (dummy = 0). Our results are robust to alternative operationalizations based on a certain threshold of parliamentary seat shares as a necessary condition to classify a government as 'broad' coalition.
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In order to examine the effects of the partisan complexion and the type of government on the relationship between austerity and social expenditures, we construct interaction terms between each of our two FA variables on the one hand, and the partisanship dummy as well as the coalition breadth dummy on the other. Finally, we construct dummy variables integrating our three major independent variables into four groups against the reference group of 'no-FAcases'. These four group-dummy variables indicate FA (or large FA) cases under (1) left-wing broad coalition governments, (2) left-wing narrow coalition/single party governments, (3) non-left broad coalition governments, and (4) non-left narrow coalition/single party governments. Figure 1 shows the descriptive relationship between these four types of government and the average changes in social expenditures. We use the total change of the current and the subsequent years since we are interested in long-run effects (see below). In line with our hypothesis, fiscal adjustments under left-wing broad coalition governments are negatively associated with social expenditure changes.
[ Figure 1 about here]
Our control variables include standard economic factors such as economic growth (data from 9 In this operationalization, 'broad' coalitions are governments that are not single-party majority governments and that simultaneously have a seat share in parliament of at least 60 or 70%. Minority governments also count as 'broad'. Among others, this operationalization ensures that 'grand coalitions' such as the coalition Austria in 2009 are treated as 'broad' as well.
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OECD, 2012), annual changes in unemployment rates (OECD, 2010b) , and economic openness (Heston et al., 2012) . In the short-run, as automatic stabilizers begin to work, poor economic performance leads to higher social expenditures. In the long-run, lower performance is expected to decrease the potential for social spending and can thus be perceived as an indicator for (higher) problem pressure. We control for additional driving forces of social expenditure as identified in the literature (see Kittel & Obinger, 2003) . First, we include the lagged level of social expenditures in order to account for catch-up and ceiling effects. The second is the share of elderly people in the population (data from OECD, 2010b).
The third is a measure for the funding structure of the welfare state, constructed as social security contributions divided by total tax revenues (OECD, 2010a) . This contrasts tax-based versus insurance-based welfare regimes, where the former is expected to be affected more directly when governments consolidate (see Kittel & Obinger, 2003, p. 31) . Finally, we control for institutional arrangements by including the Rae index of legislative fractionalization of the party system (data from Armingeon et al., 2014) .
Details on the operationalization and sources of all variables, as well as summary statistics, are found in the online appendix.
Method
We compile a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) dataset comprising of 466 country-year observations between 1982 and 2009. The data is balanced except for the missing data on Austria.
As discussed above, we have theoretical reasons to operationalize our dependent variable as first differences. There is, however, also a purely methodological justification for this approach. First, when specifying the dependent variable in levels, our data suffers from unit heterogeneity-a problem that is commonly solved by adding unit dummies to the model, i.e., fixed-effects estimation. Second, the level-version of the dependent variable has a unit root (and therefore is non-stationary), as was indicated by a battery of augmented DickeyFuller tests for panel datasets. A solution that often solves both problems simultaneously is to run the regression using first-differences, a strategy we therefore apply for methodological reasons as well.
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Most of our control variables also enter the analysis in first differences. We stick to levels, however, whenever it made sense theoretically and when the level variable turned out to have more explanatory power than the corresponding operationalization in changes.
A common downside of a model specification in first differences is the implicit assumption about the temporal effect of a change in x on y-i.e., that a change in x causes a change in y only once (instantaneously or with a constant lag) and then fades immediately.
This usually prevents the researcher to draw inferences about the long-term consequences of policy changes that are central to much of the research in comparative political economy.
We mitigate this problem by estimating a distributed lag model where we include our FA variables not only at t, but also with a one-year as well as a two-year lag (t-1 and t-2).
With respect to the lag structure of the control variables, we follow the recommendation by
De Boef and Keele (2008) and start with a general model (i.e., include contemporaneous variables as well as their lags) and impose restrictions only when empirically justified-i.e., when the respective variable did not have any substantial explanatory power.
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We include a lagged dependent variable (LDV) to address serial correlation. As there still is autocorrelation and panel heteroskedasticity, as well as cross-sectional dependence, present in our data, we include country and year fixed effects and apply OLS estimators with panel-corrected standard errors. 12 In a first step, we thus estimate autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) models, formally specified as respectively-that is, in a first step, we estimate partisan and coalition effects separately in two series of models. , , and are three coefficients each (i.e. at t, t-1, and t-2) for the relevant FA dummy (FA or FA large), the partisan/coalition dummy, respectively, and the FA*partisan/coalition interaction term. Moreover, are coefficients for our seven control variables at a maximum of three time points each. Finally, is an idiosyncratic error term. In a second step, equation (1) time-series literature) of fiscal adjustment from the coefficients of our contemporaneous and lagged FA variables as well as from the relevant partisanship or coalition interaction terms.
Substantively, the resulting battery of LRMs (for both of our FA variables under different government ideology or coalition breadth) gives the total effect of fiscal adjustment on change rates in social expenditures over a period of 3 years-i.e., the immediate effect (impact multiplier) plus the effect that occurs with a one and two year lag.
Slightly adjusted to the context of our analysis, the formula for calculating the LRM of the FA variable in the ADL model of equation (1) is given as 0 = 0 = ( 0 + 1 + 2 )/
(1 − 1 ) when the partisan/coalition dummy equals zero, and as 1 = 1 = ( 1 + 2 + 3 )/(1 − 1 ) when it equals one (i.e. the LRM of the interaction term) (De Boef & Keele, 2008) . In order to obtain the standard error for these LRMs, we follow the procedure described by Wooldridge (2013, pp. 134-135) . As an alternative method to calculate the standard errors of the LRMs, we employed the Bewley transformation (De Boef & Keele, 2008, p. 192) . This yielded slightly smaller standard errors, but we report only the more conservative estimated in this analysis. Table 2 shows the results of our main regression analyses. 14 Models 1 through 4 estimate the effects based on all fiscal adjustment (FA) cases on changes in public social spending, while models 5 through 8 estimate those based only on large FA cases (FA size larger than 1.5% of GDP). For both operationalizations, the first model of each group shows the unconditional effects; the second and third show the interaction effects of FA and government ideology/coalition breadth; and the fourth model estimates the effects of FA under the four categories of governments against the reference group of cases where no FA took place.
Empirical Findings
[ Table 2 about here]
As indicated by the coefficients for the LRM in models 1 and 5, fiscal consolidation is associated with shrinking public social expenditures over a period of three years at least (i.e., an immediate effect plus effects with a one-year and a two-year lag). Yet, this average effect is only significant for large FA. In total, during the period when a large fiscal consolidation program was enacted, the change rate of public social expenditures is reduced by 0.49 percentage points. The magnitude of this effect is comparable to the immediate positive effect that a 5.7 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate has on social expenditures (likely due to the associated increase in expenditures on unemployment benefits). The general pattern is that the coefficients estimated based on large FA cases (models 5-8) strongly amplify the negative effect on social expenditure changes found when all-both small and large-fiscal adjustments are taken into consideration (models 1-4). 15 14 We do not discuss the coefficients of the control variables, which confirm our theoretical expectations. For results of robustness tests and concerns with regard to endogeneity see the online appendix. 15 We are not formally testing the effect of the size of FA in our models by way of three-way interactions, as these are difficult to implement technically for distributed lag models and drastically reduce the number of cases These aggregate effects, however, mask some substantial variation in the impact of political factors on the degree of welfare state retrenchment. The significant interaction terms in models 2 and 6 show that in times of austerity, retrenchment is more pronounced under left governments than under non-left ones. Likewise, fiscal consolidations pursued by broad coalition governments tend to place more emphasis on trimming the social safety net than narrow coalitions do, as is indicated by the interaction terms in models 3 and 7. Some uncertainty remains with respect to both of these effects, however, since their statistical significance often turns out to be sensitive to sample modifications.
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While we cannot eliminate this uncertainty altogether, we try to mitigate the problem by looking at the two political factors simultaneously in models 4 and 8. These models disentangle the effects of partisanship (left vs. non-left) and government type (broad vs.
narrow) by estimating the effects of all four combinations that can be formed from these two binary factors separately. Here we find a very clear pattern: left-wing broad coalition governments are associated with the strongest reduction in social spending in periods of fiscal consolidation. In contrast, adjustments under non-left narrow coalition governments may even lead to welfare state expansion (although this effect is not significant for large FA). The difference in the effect of fiscal adjustment between these two groups (i.e., difference in their coefficients) is highly significant (t-values in italics). The middle group for the effect of FA is constituted by left narrow coalition governments and non-left broad coalition governments.
For the most part, these two middle groups do exhibit some significant welfare state retrenchment following the implementation of their austerity programs. These effects, for each subgroup. However, the difference in coefficients between models 1-4 and 5-8 allows us to confidently state the reinforcing negative effect of large FA. 16 The interaction term between FA and broad coalitions (model 3) misses the 90% significance level when Sweden, Finland, France, Ireland, Portugal, or Spain are excluded. For large FA (model 7), the coalition effect is not significant when Ireland is excluded from the sample. Likewise, the interaction term between large FA and left governments (model 6) is not significant when cabinets with 50% share of left parties also are operationalized as left governments. The direction of all these insignificant interaction effects remains as theoretically expected.
however, do not hold up well in all of the robustness tests. Moreover, we do not find consistent indications that the magnitude of these effects is significantly different from those found in the other groups.
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Arguably partisan effects could differ by sectors of the welfare state, e.g. labour market policies versus pensions (Jensen & Mortensen, 2014) . It is beyond the scope of this article to fully replicate our analyses on the basis of thoroughly disaggregated social expenditure data. As we show in the online appendix (Table A3) , however, our findings are robust if we exclude spending on pensions and/or health care.
We conclude that both the predominance of left parties in government and the presence of broad policy coalitions tend to foster welfare state retrenchment during austerity periods. These effects are mutually reinforcing. Moreover, if the adjustment program is large, this decisively strengthens the negative effect on the welfare state. Therefore, only the combination of all three factors-left-wing government, broad coalition, and large FA-leads to fiscal consolidations being associated with an unequivocal contraction in the trajectory of social expenditure growth, thus lending empirical support for our main hypothesis.
Conclusion
What are the conditions under which some austerity programs rely on substantial cuts to social spending? More specifically, do the partisan complexion and the type of government condition the extent to which austerity policies imply welfare state retrenchment? We argue that welfare state retrenchment is greatest when implemented by left-wing broad coalition governments, in particular in the context of large fiscal consolidations.
With regard to data and methods, this paper offers two innovations. First, it starts from policy programs as valid indicators of fiscal consolidation, and not from their outcomes of austerity measures. These outcomes may be confounded by many other variables and can therefore hardly be considered valid indicators of what we want to explain: how austerity programs are implemented and how they influence policy outcomes. Second, by introducing various lags of our main independent variables in an autoregressive distributed lag design, we are able to calculate the long-run impact of fiscal adjustment programs on welfare state retrenchment. Most research relying on analysis of cross sectional time series start with rather restricted models and heroic assumptions about the temporal effects between a change in the independent and the dependent variables. Calculating the long run effects based on distributed lags-as we have done it in this article-may be a useful strategy to solve these problems, which are frequently ignored in standard TSCS analyses of fiscal adjustments and welfare state reform.
In substantive terms, we offer an explanation, which is based on the combination of a partisan and a type of government argument. With regard to the partisan logic, we observe a 'Nixon goes to China' scenario (Kitschelt, 2001) . Left-wing governments tend to be significantly better able to target the welfare state than non-left governments are, which we essentially explain with their historical reputation as long-standing welfare state founders and defenders. With regard to the type of government, we find that broad pro-reform coalitions (surplus or minority governments) tend to be most likely to implement consolidations that trim the social safety net. This is due to the lower political and electoral risks, as well as, the higher time-consistency associated with policy-packages that are conceived and supported by broad pro-reform coalitions. Public Social Expenditure t-1 -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.10*** (0 as well as contemporaneous and lagged versions of interaction terms) are not reported. * < 0.10; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01
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Elderly Population
Population 65 and over as a percentage of total population (centered). Source: OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics.
Social Contributions as Percentage of Taxes
Social security contributions as a percentage of GDP divided by total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP. Source: OECD Tax Statistics.
Party System Fractionalization
Legislative (based on seat shares) fractionalization of the party system according to the Rae index (centered). Source: Armingeon et al. (2014) . (16 countries 1982 (16 countries -2009 (16 countries plus Austria 1992 (16 countries -2009 Large FA
Methodological concerns: Robustness tests and endogeneity
We ran additional robustness tests for our analyses (regression estimates available upon request). First, our findings are robust to alternative operational definitions, such as continuous variables instead of dummies for the FA variables, the modification of the threshold constructing the dummy for left governments, using a continuous partisanship variable in separate models or using data from the Manifesto Project 1 , and an alternative coalition measure, where broad coalitions are minority or multi-party governments with a certain threshold of parliamentary support (see section 3). Second, our findings are robust against including a number of additional controls, such as institutional variables for federalism and bicameralism, and a dummy variable for Eurozone membership, as well as excluding controls (see models A1 and A2 in Table A3 ). Third, our main result suggested by models 4 and 8-essentially an identification of those combinations of government type and partisan complexion that are most conducive or obstructive to welfare-state-driven fiscal adjustment-is robust to the exclusion of any of the 17 countries in the data set. 2
A final issue concerns the possibility of endogeneity in our explanation. It could be the case, that both left-wing governments and broad policy coalitions exhibit a higher propensity for large fiscal adjustments to begin with, which is in turn correlated with a greater reliance on social spending cuts. Although recent research points to such complex influences of political factors on fiscal adjustment programs (AUTHORS, 2014; , we need to differentiate between the decision to consolidate on the one hand, and the size of that consolidation on the other. Using Tobit models, 1 Source: . We calculated governments' annual left-right scores from the Manifesto Project dataset following the procedure laid out by based on their update of the Party Government data set by . We then created the group dummies from our Models 4 and 8 (left/broad etc.) using the sample median of the manifesto left-right score as a cutoff for our left dummy. In these models, the group differences between left/broad and non-left/narrow remain significant (t=-2.31 for all FA, t=-2.64 for FA large). 2 Excluding Spain leads to a result where the coefficient in model 4 for FA under left broad governments misses significance (p=0.31). Consequently, the difference of this group to the effect by non-left narrow governments is significant at the 87%-level only. Given that these are two-sided tests of significance, we do not consider this finding to be too critical, though. When looking at large FA cases only in model 8, both estimates remain statistically significant at the 90%-level even when Spain is excluded.
essentially assumes that there is a uniform process influencing both the likelihood of fiscal adjustments and its size in the same direction (see . In an earlier publication on precisely that question, however, we found that likelihood and size might be detrimental: right-wing narrow coalitions have a higher likelihood to consolidate, yet their adjustment programs are likely to be of smaller size (AUTHORS, 2014) . Therefore, it is unclear whether this really indicates an endogeneity issue with regard to the reliance of adjustments on welfare state spending.
Having said this, our tests show that neither the likelihood nor the sizes of FA under left-wing broad coalition governments are significantly different from the likelihood or size of the other three groups. More specifically, we apply two-sided t-tests comparing the mean likelihood of FA, as well as the mean size of FA, under each of the four types of government against the average of the three remaining governments. The results are shown in Table A4 .
For the group of left, broad coalition governments, the mean differences to the other governments are not statistically different from zero (p>0.20). We also test likelihood and size against each other group on its own (thus always excluding two groups). Here the only significant difference concerning left broad governments is that their adjustments are smaller in size than those of non-left broad governments (p=0.02). However, considering only large FA, this size difference is insignificant (p=0.67). Since-in contrast to non-left narrow governments-non-left broad governments are not the main group of reference to which we test and compare the effects of FA on social expenditure, we conclude that there are no systematic differences in the likelihood and size of FA among our types of governments that are endogenous to our main causal mechanisms. Moreover, the restrictive nature of our robustness tests, such as excluding whole country series from the sample, gives no rise to serious endogeneity concerns. 
